EUROPEAN UNION AND LIBYAN CIVIL WAR
Ahmet Berke İlhan
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PSIR 332 EUROPEAN UNION
I - Introduction
This paper aims to analyze the outbreak of the Libyan Civil War and evaluate how did decision-making process work within the political structure of the EU in the progress of the war and afterward. While presenting the arguments, the relations between Libya and the European Union before the war will be examined, the decision-making process of the European Union in Foreign Policy will be presented, and the functioning of the CFSP will be explained. In the first part of this article, which consists of three main parts, the unique decision-making and foreign policy-making mechanism of the European Union will be examined and the relations between the European Union and Libya will be evaluated from the perspective of International Relations. In the second part, as a political actor, the European Union's Interplay with Libya, its economic relations and the actions it took in line with its political ideals during the war, and how it tried to shape the political climate of Libya afterward will be emphasized, and how the migration crisis, which is a result of the Libyan Civil War, was met from the EU perspective and how the migration waves had an impact on the EU's foreign policy and joint decision-making process will be discussed. In the third and last part, in parallel with the research question, the foreign policy effectiveness and efficiency of the EU after the 2011 Libyan Civil War will be tried to be understood and the political position of the European Union in International Relations will be evaluated.
The joint decision-making mechanism of the European Union, which expanded with the agreements signed on economic, political, and social issues, was also expanding with every agreement in terms of common foreign policy. The European Union, which took on a homogeneous political structure with its deepening and enlargement policies, was also in the plan of being a solid international actor with integration in security and foreign policy issues. Should Europe be a “space” or a power, and, if the latter, a civil or military power? For many years these alternatives have informed the debate on the purpose of European integration and the way the Union acts on the international stage (Ehrhart, 2002).
Especially in the process that started with the Maastricht Agreement and in the early 2000s, with the increasing security issues and discussions, the European Union took on a more concrete structure in terms of security and foreign policy. Due to the September 11 attack and increasing terrorist acts, security concerns increased and the European Union was demanded to produce policies for security concerns by the European citizens. However, the concepts of security and foreign policy were conceptually separated from the issues of economic and political cooperation. Even though the existence of security problems and the need for policy making were taken for granted by the internal actors, the desire of the member states to carry out autonomous decision-making mechanisms on security and foreign policy was an obstacle. These are admittedly two extreme models, each of which can justify and legitimate a certain form of external action by the Union. Each has been fuelled by the differing cultures and historical legacies of member states, some have favored military interventionism while others have followed a more abstentionist policy, reflecting the diverging conceptions of the relationship that the European Union should have with the United States, on the one hand, and the Union’s attitude to the Notion of power itself on the other (Ehrhart, 2002).
In any case, even the discussion of the defense and foreign policy frameworks within the European Union was a progressive dilemma, because as of the early 2000s, the issue of common defense had come to the fore, and solutions for the foreign policy had been proposed. Although there were groundbreaking developments in the political and economic field and expansionary agreements were signed in the previous years, the idea of consensus and joint decision-making on the common defense and foreign policy was not even open to discussion. Especially with September 11 and the USA's declaration of war on terrorism, it became essential for European Union to take a step in foreign policy and security. In addition, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the international turbulent process after it led to the long multilateral policy-making process of the European Union to function with taking into consideration of current concerns. The remit of policy discussion within CFSP has expanded considerably. From a point at which the Member States were unable to discuss formally any aspect of security issues in the early 1980s, CFSP now includes ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy which might lead to a common defense (Tonra, 2002). In times of crisis or extraordinary international distress, the signing of defense pacts or bilateral union agreements is a common trend. The harmonizing of the European Union's foreign policy, especially in the 2000s, and the moderation of the member states to make concessions on the sui generis forms is a parallel example. In retrospect, it is arguable that the tendency to defect and/or go it alone has shrunk significantly, even on the part of the most assertive member states, and that the overall benefits of collective action are increasingly being acknowledged. The EU framework, in other words, has become an indispensable ‘cover’ for all partners (Missiroli, 2000). The invasion of Iraq had a two-dimensional meaning for our understanding of the European Union and the CFSP. In the first dimension, the main foreign policy perspective of the European Union was to support the maintenance of peace in the Middle East and to prevent the economic interests of the European Union from being harmed. From this point of view, it can be said that the desire of the member states to protect their interests partially helps the joint decision-making process in the foreign policy mechanism of the European Union. In the second dimension, the fact that the European Union is an actor that takes decisions jointly as one body raises the question. Will the European Union produce policies that support the policies of the USA or will it proceed in line with these decisions by making different decisions that are challenging to the USA? The problems that emerged at this stage were an obstacle to the European Union's enthusiasm to become an active actor in the CFSP issue. It would be wrong to despair of the EU or its ambition to have an effective CFSP just because of Iraq, which at this stage of the CFSP development was simply too tough to test (Crowe, 2003).
From the coup of Muammar Gaddafi in 1969 until 2011, when he was killed during the civil war, Libya was a substantial and equally interesting actor that frequently appeared on the international scene. With its pan-Arabist and anti-imperialist approaches, Libya, which has conflicted with many countries, especially the US, and has been subject to sanctions from time to time, has a very unusual and special place in terms of the European Union's Foreign Policy Analysis. Politically, although Libya does not have friendly relations with European countries, economic relations between European countries and Libya continued to progress at an advanced level even during the sanction decisions imposed by the US. Between 1971 and 1976, for example, the French signed more than a dozen agreements with Libya, especially in the field of armament and energy, while the Spaniards secured a significant presence in the hydrocarbons sector. The Germans, for their part, appropriated considerable shares in the chemicals and petrochemicals sectors (Zoubir, 2009). There was a natural economic link between Libya and Europe, which were physically close to each other, and this link was a strategic relationship that needed to be preserved for both sides. Even during the political crises that Libya was in during the 80s and 90s, the US sanctions on Libya were not warmly welcomed by the European Union countries. Even during the political sanctions that the European Union declared against Libya, it continued its strategic partnership with Libya and did not reduce its trade volume. The sanctions against Libya have been cited as an example of the utility of the sanctions weapon in disciplining aberrant states, especially by the United States. Yet, despite Libyan complaints that the sanctions regime in the 1990s caused it the equivalent of $34 billion in damages and lost business, the reality was that its essential energy trade with Europe continued unabated throughout their application (Joffe, 2011). In addition, the European Union stood in the way of the oil embargo that the US wanted to declare against Libya and prevented the implementation of this sanction decision. Three countries from the European Union—Germany, Italy, and Spain—alone accounted for 80 percent of Libyan exports, the EU attracting 85 percent of all exports and generating 75 percent of Libyan imports (Joffé, 2001). In addition, the inclusion of Libya in the European Neighborhood Policy, which is based on economic development and liberalization initiated by the European Union, was one of the important turning points in the relations between Libya and the European Union in the mid-2000s. In fact, the reason why a union with the motto of building the economic and political order in democratic and peaceful ways builds good relations with a country governed by a dictatorial regime stems from pragmatic demands. Overall, the partial inclusion of Libya into the ENP reflects the increasing role of the EU’s internal concerns vis-a`-vis the country and a change in policy as concerns the instruments with which to pursue its goals (Bosse, 2013). In this period, it can be observed that European Union member states such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom maintained positive relations with Libya, signed broad economic agreements, and gave some support to Libya in the international arena. Thus, even though it was not in full cooperation with the European Union, Libya had a place in the political orbit of the European Union. Essentially, the reason why Libya was in the close perspective of the European Union at the time of the crisis in domestic politics and during the period when the Civil War was fueled is linked with this specific matter. In addition, the European Parliament (EP) was initially rather keen on including Libya within the orbit of the ENP. In its Napolitano Report of 2003, the EP called for ‘relations with the Mediterranean region to take account not only of those countries which are already members of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership but also of Libya’, which had observer status and which was also, above all, a member of the ‘embryonic Arab Maghreb Union’ (Napolitano Report, 2003).
II-Libyan Civil War
The arrest of human rights campaigner Fethi Tarbel in Benghazi on February 15 sparked riots in the city. The riots soon turned into a countrywide revolt against Gaddafi, who has ruled the country for almost four decades. They were sparked by turmoil sweeping much of the Arab world. The Gaddafi regime responded harshly and violently to the street demonstrations and protests that had social repercussions and were attended by thousands of people. A month later, the Transitional National Council declared itself the sole and legitimate power of the country and the end had begun for Gaddafi. On the other hand, the United Nations has created a wide package that includes an arms embargo and various embargoes on Libya to stop the civilian massacres and acts of violence immediately. In addition, the United Nations Security Council, with the Resolution 1973, declared a no-fly zone in Libya, and the decision to launch a military operation to stop the atrocities in Libya was agreed upon. The NATO coalition, mainly the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, launched a heavy air strike operation against the Gaddafi Regime forces in Libya. While the response of the UNSC to the Libyan crisis was praised for its unprecedented speed and unanimity (Morris, 2011) the performance of the European Union was met with sharp criticism. The EU’s reaction was criticized for being too slow, too weak, too divided, and essentially incoherent (Kundnani, Vaisse, 2011). Some already mourned the death of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it (Armellini, 2011). But why? Why were the European Union's decision-making process and mechanism on common security and foreign policy criticized? In fact, the answer to this question lies in the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force two years before the Libyan Civil War, in the unofficial constitution of the European Union. The European Union, which implemented the OLP mechanism with the Lisbon Treaty, brought the integration of institutions to a different dimension in all policy areas, except for common security and foreign policy issues the policy-making process regarding the common security and foreign policy was codified as soft law (Fabbrini, 2014) and the voluntary coordination principle (Fabbrini, 2014) was taken as the basis and became much more supranational than it had before. Although the principle of voluntary coordination is based on foreign policy, the involvement of some member countries in the Libyan Civil War and differences of opinion within the European Union, shortly after the OLP mechanism came into effect, caused the CSFP to be questioned. In addition to this, the differences of opinion among the member states had been a crucial controversy for the European Union during the Libyan Civil War. When examined from the perspective of the member states, France’s stance was a more specific and rapid (Marchi, 2017) intervention plan compared to other member countries, Gaddafi's withdrawal from power was an uncompromising objective, and France was one of the three countries that undertook the NATO operation, together with the US and the UK. In Italy, the general opinion was that Prime Minister Berlusconi was late in reacting and joining the European Union on the CSFP issue (RomaTre University, 2011). In Germany, the situation was more sophisticated since the German government was being non-aligned with other member states and was holding abstaining attitudes towards the case. For this reason, public opinion was critical of the government for not taking any actions (Das Spiegel, 2011).
III - Aftermath and Consequences
With the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, claims of legitimate authority to rule emerged between armed groups and different power groups in Libya. The main focus of the United Nations and the European Union in Libya was to end the armed actions, prevent civilian massacres, and ensure social peace. The main perspective of the European Union was the safe return of civilians displaced from their homes during the civil war, an end to regional conflicts, and an immediate end to casualties (Siebens & Case, 2012). In this context, the European Union provided incentives to the GNC, recognized by the United Nations, to comply with international norms and to allocate a sustainable political system and welfare regime. But what remained of the Libyan Civil War was the struggle for power of armed rebellious groups with the atmosphere of conflict in the shadow of the effort to establish a legitimate government by the external actors. Libya has essentially become ungoverned, and ungovernable, as military power has become so diffuse and command so hyper-localized that the national military is considered little more than just one among hundreds of militias (Shadid, 2012). The Libyan Civil War turned into a human tragedy with the harsh and armed intervention of the Gaddafi Regime and the intervention of NATO. Only in the first month of the armed conflicts, did 180,000 people have to leave the country (William et al., 2012) and flee to the neighboring countries. This number tripled in a short time with international intervention (Usaid, 2012). With the effect of the deepening crisis and destabilization, Libyans made attempts to move to Europe in search of safer and better conditions. Before the war, one of the priorities of Libya and the European Union in bilateral relations was the issue of illegal immigrants. The tolerance offered to Gaddafi by the European Union was partly due to Libya's duty to prevent illegal crossings into the soil of the European Union. However, the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime after the civil war, the failure of the legitimate government to establish political dominance over the whole country, and the people leaving the country due to armed conflicts, accelerated the flow of immigrants to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Due to geographical conditions, the European countries that were most affected by this migration wave were Malta and Italy. These two countries, which are the destination of the migration route, faced an intense migration wave after 2011. Across the Mediterranean Sea, Malta and Italy have viewed these flows of irregular migration largely as a ‘threat’, an ‘invasion’, and a ‘crisis’. EU membership has created a perverse incentive for this particular interpretation, as these countries have accused other member states of leaving them to bear the brunt of the so-called migration ‘burden’ in Europe (Mainwaring, 2012). After this stage, the implementation of the decisions taken in the 2000s regarding the CFSP came to the fore. With the FRONTEX maneuver, the European Union member states were connected to act with joint action on security. With the process that started after the Arab Spring and the Libyan Civil War, the member states' concerns about border protection and security had increased. Due to the increasing pressure between governments, it can be observed that the objective of the European Union on CFSP has evolved as of this process and the member states have exhibited more protectionist and approaching policies on security.
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