IMPACT OF CRISES (EUROZONE, MIGRATION, BREXIT) ON EUROSCEPTICISM LEVELS IN SOUTHERN MEMBER STATES (GREECE, ITALY, SPAIN)
ECEM DÖNMEZ
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PSIR 332 EUROPEAN UNION
I- Introduction
This paper is an attempt to search the link between recent crises such as Eurozone, migration and Brexit crises which have not been solved yet and still had an enormous place in the European Union, and analyzing Euroscepticism levels in three of southern member states which are Greece, Italy and Spain. The paper includes data, from surveys to see the link between the impacts of the crises in Greece, Italy and Spain which are belongs to southern member states in the European Union. The surveys from Eurobarometer which can be find European Union’s website. This paper includes six chapters. First chapter is introduction part which is giving the information about the research. Second chapter clarify the definition of Euroscepticism, explains the importance of Euroscepticism and examine the methods which are using for measure Euroscepticism level in the countries. Third chapter is about crises which European Union faced after the 2000. This chapter aims to, inform about crises and the European Union’s response to the crises. Fourth chapter is about Euroscepticism and the three of the Southern member states which are Greece, Italy and Spain. This Chapter targeting to explain Euroscepticism levels in chosen countries and aiming to find linkages between crises and Euroscepticism levels by Eurobarometer results. The last chapter is conclusion chapter. Conclusion chapter aims to summarize the research and telling the significance of the paper.
II- Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism refers to skepticism about Europe or European integration. (Hooghe, Marks, 2007, p.119). It is a negative concept which is opposing the European Union. Taggart’s initial observation that, Euroscepticism was used as a term that ‘expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European Integration (Szczerbiak, Taggart, 2003). There are two types of Euroscepticism which are hard Euroscepticism and soft Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak, Taggart, 2003). There are not, statistical data for measure Euroscepticism levels. Measurements of Euroscepticism levels based on, public opinions, referendums, levels of trust in the political regime, institutions, political actors and type of party systems in that country (Szczerbiak, Taggart, 2003). These methods can be used for calculate Euroscepticism levels in the countries. Euroscepticism is important. Because it is more than a mere attitude, it is an ideological dimension which can communicated in many forms and can be changed. (Flood,2002, P.73). For example; it is between individuals and politicians, interviews, books, journalists. People’s opinion can be changed. In other words, Euroscepticism has got dependent variables and independent variables. Euroscepticism is also important for European Integration. However, it can be threat for the future of European Integration. Because optimistic or pessimistic assessments can give rise to legitimacy crises in the European Union. (Flood,2002, P.73).
III- Crises
III.I. Eurozone Crisis
Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007. After the Lisbon Treaty European Union, looks future hopefully. However, at the same time in 2007 global economic crises started with the United States of America (USA). After the USA, the economic crises struck the EU on 9 August 2007 (Hodson, Puetter, 2015). In 2008, the crises hit the Europe and the European Union had to deal with the biggest economic crises (Bauer, Becker, 2014, p.213). The Euro crises includes more than one crisis. Because of that, it named by different names, like Eurozone crises, depth crises, financial crises, growth crises (Lawrence, 2013, p.194). It was huge damage for European economy. Financial crises caused to growth rates, rising unemployment, soaring public deficits and depts (Serricchio, Tsakatika, Quaglia, 2013). In the Eurozone crises more than 80 million people live in poverty in the European Union (Kentikelenis, Papanicolas, 2012). However, Greece was the most affected country. Because, when the Greece entered the Europe, Greece government had got enormous numbers of loans and depts. European Union’s, Economic Adjustment Program reported that, Greece’s depts were 300 million euros and government dept reached 115% of GDP in 2009. Statistical results of ‘Economic Adjustment Program for Greece’ showed that, in April 2010, Greece announced its budget as 12.7% while the Eurozone limit was 3%. The numbers indicated that, Greece’ s financial conditions, during the Euro crisis.
On the other side, during the crises, there was other member states who was in financial crises too. Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain which called ‘PIIGS’ were the weakest economies in the Eurozone (Wu, Lee, Chang, 2014). European depth crises created solidarity crises too. Because, rich countries did not want to provide financial support to the Greece and the countries which had got weak economies. This caused to deepening. As a result of deepening, member states decided to take an action for extinguished the impacts of crises and they try to build new policies (Lawrence, 2013, p.198). Member states understood that, it was not easy to giving up from the Euro (Schimmelfennig, 2014, p.328) and that is why European Union did not let to Greece fall. European Union started to help Greece about financial aids.
The Commission from European Union, prepared bailout package. The packages were financial assistance for Greece. Greece could not produce money because it was in eurozone. There are 19 member states in the Eurozone, not all the member states and they were using the same money which is ‘Euro’. European Central Bank was responsible for producing money. For this reason, Greece, increased the taxes, decreased the salaries and public spending. It applied austerity policies. As a consequences of austerity policies, unemployment reached to 18.5%, youth unemployment soared to 21% in Greece. Between 2010 and the beginning of 2012, Greece was the recipient of approximately 400 billion Euro, this being considered as “the most ex- pensive bail-out in the history of the European Union.” (Radu, 2012, p. 62). This poverty conditions open the way to protests, and the citizens blamed the government and the European Union for austerity policies (Schimmelfennig, 2014, p.322). When Syriza win the elections in 2015, in Greece, he said, ‘Enough is enough’. He did a referendum for say no, to austerity measures. However, European Union did not help Greece. Because of that, radicalism increased, and it opened the way for Euroscepticism attitudes in the Greece.
III.II. Migration Crisis
European Union had to face with another crisis after the 2010. Migration crisis came to a head in Europe in the summer of 2015, Syrians have made the journey through Greece and the Balkans to Germany. The prolonged conflict in Syria has resulted in a humanitarian and political crisis, which also affects Europe (Hoel, 2015). Greece blamed for did not protect the borders by European Union. Also Italy blamed for the same reason too.
Migration crises is European crises. Because most of the migrants tried to immigrate to the Europe. This, created political problems between countries. European Union started to immigration policy with Maastricht Treaty, in 3rd pillar. This was the first time that European Union’s had immigration policy. Then with Amsterdam Treaty 3rd pillar moved to the 1st pillar and became supranational. However, in 2015 migration crises, European Union failed to make policy among the member states. Because as the sovereign depth crises, European Union responded migration crises like an intergovernmental body (Park, 2015). European Union’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis is further characterized by the fact that its authors have applied an intergovernmental perspective (Hoel,2015).
The real crises were humanitarian crises. During the crises European Union did not focus on the real crises. European Union focused on economic policy. It has got two different approaches in policy making, about immigration policy which are open door policy and zero refugee policy. Open door policy belongs to the Merkel under the Germany and zero refugee policy belongs to the Orban under the Hungary. Orban’s policy is against refugees. He argued that ‘All the terrorists are basically migrants.’ Merkel way is more humanitarian than Orban way. Open door policy, accepts refugees. Merkel and Orban’s ways were opposite to each other. During the migration crises southeastern Europe became increasingly important because refugees targeted to come Southern Europe. European Union estimated that, thousands of migrants will cross the Aegean Sea from Turkey to the Greek islands. That is why European Union decided to cooperate with Turkey which was a candidate country for stop flow of migrants (Wirth, 2016, p.45). European Union and Turkey made a statement which aimed to readmits irregular migrants in Europe. European Union see Turkey as a third country, not a state. However, Turkey did not apply its responsibilities. Because of that refugees in Greece and Italy did not decrease and European Union failed to prevent the crises.
III.III. Brexit
The United Kingdom (UK) joined the EU, then known as the EEC (European Economic Community), in 1973 (Grilli, 1994). It was the member of European Union over the forty years. European Union and UK had got differentiations, UK had got complaints about European Union. Brexit means that United Kingdom's (UK) decision to leave the European Union. In June 2016 the UK voted in a referendum to leave the EU which provided a challenge for the UK in terms of negotiating the terms of ‘Brexit’ and a potential challenge for the EU itself as one of its major members opted to leave (Bulmer, Quaglia, 2018).
According to BBC News, The UK has voted to leave the EU by 52% to %48 during the time of David Cameron who was the Prime Minister of the UK. David Cameron wanted to stay in European Union, the results was surprising for him (Kroll, Leuffen,2016, p.1311). After the referendum he could not prevent Brexit. As a consequence of the results, negotiations started between European Union, UK and the other member states for determined the relations, laws, principles after the Brexit. The deal is known as the Withdrawal Agreement (Łazowski, 2012). Withdrawal of member states belongs to Article 50 which is came with Lisbon Treaty. Negotiations between European Union and the UK continued 3 years. Because, withdrawn conditions did not determine clearly in the Article 50. After 3 years negotiations, UK leaved from the European Union without agreements. Brexit was huge crises for European Union. Because it was the first time a member state withdrawn from the Union which has got important role on economy and policy in the Union.
IV- Euroscepticism In Southern Member States; Greece, Italy and Spain
This essay chooses Southern member states to research Euroscepticism levels after the crises. Because statistical results from Eurobarometer proved that southern member states had got more damages than northern member states during the crises. In the standard Eurobarometer, there is no question that directly addresses the issue of Euroscepticism (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2006); however, it can be look the people’s level of trust in the European Union or the performance of the EU, their optimistic or pessimistic attitudes through the future of the European Union, and evaluate the Eurosceptic attitudes across a given period of time. There are statistical results from Eurobarometer which are help to understand Euroscepticism levels. In this paper, statistical results are separated by years to understand, impact of crises on the southern member states.
First examination is from 2010, after the eurozone crises. The survey looked the percentage of the trust to the European Union (European Commission, 2010). After the eurozone crises, statistical results showed that, in Spain trust level was %43, in Greece %42, in Italy %42. In construct the result of not trusts was, in Spain %44, in Greece %56 and in Italy it was %41. The result from the Eurobarometer in 2010, is inferred that trust to the European Union was less than not to trust. On the other hand, the results of the current situation of the economy at national level in 2011 (European Commission, 2011), showed that, Greece total good level was %1, Spain total good level was %4 and the Italy’s was %9. (Gomez, 2015) shows that during the crisis citizens at least partially blamed the EU for their economic conditions. According to results of national levels on economy in southern member states, it shows the impact of the crises on national levels and this leads to Euroscepticism too. According to the data, Euroscepticism increased at 2010, after the Eurozone crises, especially in the Greece.
2010 Survey Results (Trust in the European Union)
(Tend to trust/ Tend not to trust/ Do not know)
Figure 1. Survey Results of Trust in the European Union 2010, by European Commission, August 2010, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm,Copyright 2010 by European Commission
2011 Survey Results (The Current Situation of the Economy at National Level: National Results)
(Total good/ Total bad/ Do not know)
Figure 2. Survey Results of Trust in the European Union 2011, by European Commission, December 2011, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm,Copyright 2011 by European Commission
Second examination from Eurobarometer in 2015 and 2016 for see the impact of migration crises on the three of the southern member states. The surveys were about the future of the European Union. Data showed that countries views about European Union. In 2015 data, percentage of optimistic views were %41 in Greece, %59 in Spain, %53 in Italy and pessimistic views were %57, %59, %53 with given order (European Commission, 2015). However, in 2016 data, the percentage of optimistic views was, %28 in Greece, %57 in Spain and %49 in Italy. In contrary pessimistic view to European Union was, %70 in Greece, %36 in Spain and %44 in Italy. Taking the statistical results into consideration, pessimistic views on the European Union increased in 2016, after the migration crises. According to results the migration crises created negative images on the southern member states and because of negative images about European Union Euroscepticism levels increased in Greece, Spain and Italy.
2015 Survey Results (The Future of the European Union: National Results)
(Total Optimistic/ Total Pessimistic/ Do not know)
Figure 3. Survey Results of Trust in the European Union 2015, by European Commission, July 2015, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm,Copyright 2015 by European Commission
2016 Survey Results (The future of the European Union: National results)
(Total Optimistic/ Total Pessimistic/ Do not know)
Figure 4. Survey Results of Trust in the European Union 2016, by European Commission, July 2016, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm,Copyright 2016 by European Commission
Third examination from 2017 surveys from Eurobarometer. The surveys were about trust in European Union. Data showed that tend to trust was %23 in Greece, %44 in Spain, %34 in Italy. In construct, tend not to trust was %74 in Greece, %47 in Spain and %52 in Italy (European Commission, 2017) When the issue of trust compares between 2010 to 2017, statistical results proved that there was a decrease of the trust to the European Union in southern member states. Before the 2017 surveys there was migration crises. One year before the surveys, in 2016 Brexit showed itself. Brexit was crises for European Union. The results indicated that migration and Brexit crises had got impact on Euroscepticism attitudes in the southern member states.
2010 Survey Results (Trust in the European Union)
(Tend to trust/ Tend not to trust/ Do not know)
Figure 1. Survey Results of Trust in the European Union 2010, by European Commission, August 2010, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm,Copyright 2010 by European Commission
2017 Survey Results (Trust in the European Union: National Results and Evolutions)
(Tend to trust/ Tend not to trust/ Do not know)
Figure 5. Survey Results of Trust in the European Union 2017, by European Commission, November 2017, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm,Copyright 2017 by European Commission
V- Conclusion
Taking everything into consideration, this research aims to uncover the European Union’s crises which happened after 2000, named by Eurozone, Immigration and Brexit and their impacts on Euroscepticism levels in Southern member states which are Greece, Spain and Italy. This research is important for understand linkages between European Union crises and Euroscepticism levels. This paper explained the Eurozone, migration and Brexit crises and European Union’s response to the crises. It covered that, at the times of crisis such as Eurozone, migration and Brexit, European Union responded to the crisis with intergovernmental body. As a result of intergovernmental attitudes, European Union could not act quickly against the crisis. Because of that reasons, it leads to Euroscepticism in southern member states which are Greece, Spain and Italy. In this research, Eurobarometer results used, to find Euroscepticism levels on Greece, Spain and Italy. After the examination about Euroscepticism levels in the southern member states, the statistical results showed that, European Union crises which happened after 2000, has got impact on Southern member states such as Greece, Italy and Spain.
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