YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
PSIR332
EUROPEAN UNION
FINAL PAPER
“The Impact of Emmanuel Macron's Populism on
the Foreign Policy of the European Union”
Ezgi Yaren Akyol
Spring 2021
INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to analyze the possible impact of the populism of French President, Emmanuel Macron, on the European Union’s foreign policy. The main question asked for this is whether a leader who emerged as a defender of liberal democracy has an effect, with his populist rhetoric, on the recent foreign policy crises in the EU and taking slow action against the crises. In this paper, it will be argued that Macron uses EU foreign policy to make France one of the global powers again on the world and within the EU, and he does this with a populist approach. The reason for the emergence of this question is, in a macro perspective, in addition to the popular question of whether populism poses a threat to the democratic principles of the EU, to analyze how populist policies affect EU foreign policy through the policies of a leader who claims to be a liberal democrat.
This study is divided into three main sections. In the first part, a conceptual definition of populism will be presented and then it will be discussed whether populism is a threat to the EU, and if so, in what ways. In the second part, since Macron came to power in 2017, French domestic politics, foreign policy, and Macron's populist policies will be examined under three sub-titles. In the last part, the general attitude of the European Union in foreign policy, the current attitudes of the member countries, and the current crises will be briefly examined, and whether Macron's populism has an effect on this will be discussed in the last sub-title.
LITERATURE REVIEW
It is possible to say that the literature on populism is quite extensive, and this study’s conceptual framework is based on the studies of Laclau and Müller. With the effect of the increasing populism in Europe in recent years, studies focused on this subject have also increased, as Cadier and Lequesne's report explores how populist governments influence foreign policy (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020), Brubaker has also had a useful study on why populism is so popular in recent years (Brubaker, 2017). In addition, there are many studies that evaluate Macron's rhetoric from a populist perspective, and although he did not evaluate it with a populist approach, Giurlando, who evaluated Macron's economic rivalry with Germany, made an important contribution to the literature (Giurlando, 2021). The work of Buštíková and Guasti, on the other hand, is a useful study in terms of handling Macron's populism technocratically and showing the change that France is going through (Buštíková & Guasti , 2019).
However, it is seen that there is no study in the literature that directly examines the use of populist rhetoric in Macron's politics and EU foreign policy, among issues that have been studied independently such as increasing populism in the EU, Macron's populism, the effect of populism on foreign policy and the economic rivalry between France and Germany.
The impact of a leader's populist rhetoric on foreign policy, who is introduced as a liberal democracy advocate, is important both for understanding the foreign policy of the European Union and for estimating the possibilities in its internal dynamics. This study was carried out to eliminate this deficiency in the literature.
1. WHAT IS POPULISM?
In his popular work, “What is populism?”, Müller argues that populism is a natural outcome of representative democracy and a combination of, the opposition to political elites, be the voice of the “the people”, anti-pluralism and not recognizing legitimate power other than itself. In addition, oppressive, partisan actions that will continue these claims and the call for elections at a sufficient level to continue the symbolic will of the people are among their distinctive features (Müller, 2017). Of course, not every political discourse that speaks for the people can be considered as populist. Laclau, one of the important theorists of populism, states that populist discourses are not only expressed linguistically, they contain a whole verbal and operational logic, and this logic makes antagonistic calls to the dominant ideology (Lyrintzis, 1990). After that, these antagonistic calls were replaced with a unity discourse and claiming the only legitimate power is itself. On the other hand, differently from Müller, Laclau supposed that the sources of populism and politics are the same, in terms of acceptance of segregation in society, the construction of an ambiguous and oppressed people concept, and speaking in the name of all of them (Laclau, 2005). As he said in his article of the same name, “Constructing a People Is the Main Task of Radical Politics” and populism is also equated with politics in terms of creating its own symbolic people (Laclau, 2006).
Brubaker argues that populism is divided into horizontal and vertical. Vertical populism emphasizes inequalities and hierarchy within the country and focuses on the politically and economically powerful elites. On the other hand, horizontal populism can be interpreted as an anti-foreign opposition to "unity" within the country. While this situation in right populism tends to declare everyone outside and foreigners inside as enemies, referring to common culture and ethnic ties, left populism argues that outside economic and political unions (like European Union and NATO) and activities (globalism, imperialism) pose a threat. Before completing this conceptual introduction, it is worth mentioning that in various governments around the world, regardless of political culture, populism is seen regardless of the economic preferences of the government, it's ideological positioning, whether it is secular or religious (Brubaker, 2017).
1.2. Is Populism a threat for European Union?
There are some demographic and economic reasons for the protectionist populism that has been increasingly seen in Europe in recent years. Here, protectionist populism is to keep the people, that is, the real people, whom the populists claim to be the only legitimate representatives of them, homogeneous within its current sovereignty by protecting it from political and economic external traps and cultural distortions. The EU, on the other hand, became the direct target of this type of populism, Eurosceptics claimed that the EU was anti-democratic, using the supranational institutions as an excuse. It is worth mentioning here that populists' discourse of reallocating democracy is also quite common.
The first of these reasons is the whole of the economic crises in the EU; Great Recession, debt crisis, Eurozone and EU institutions crisis. Increasing unemployment and many economic problems experienced by the people have led to an increase in left populism in these countries.
The most obvious examples of this are Greece and Syriza. Tsipras named the European Commission, IMF, and Central Bank as the hated/external troika, which he claimed that the Greek people took three institutions responsible for the austerity measures and hated them. He also called “internal troikas” to undermine the legitimacy of the country's previous tripartite coalition (Siomos & Stavrakakis, 2016). This is also an example of how vertical and horizontal populisms are intertwined in Europe. The country's elites are also portrayed as outsiders who have lost their national identity, acting in concert with foreign powers (Brubaker, 2017).
The migration crisis in 2015 and the asylum demands of Muslims fleeing the civil war in the Middle East have increased this protectionist populism. These potential refugees were regarded as a risk that would change the works, lifestyles, and culture of Europeans, and the discourse of homogeneous society was emphasized. Anti-immigrant and especially islamophobic parties have gained strength.
Angela Merkel, who is the most warm-hearted name on the immigration issue, faced serious opposition in her country on this issue. The radical right populist, anti-immigrant party AFD passed the threshold in the elections and showed the public's reaction. Similar situations have been encountered in many European parliaments (Brubaker, 2017). One of the biggest reactions to the issue was Hungarian president Orban, who said he would get rid of what he called "suicidal liberalism" of the EU by putting barbed wire on the border (Novak, 2015). One of the important factors that led to this kind of protectionist populism and its evolution into Islamophobia was the radical Islamic terrorist attacks that took place in European city centers in 2015. While these attacks increased anti-immigrant sentiment, they also gave right-wing populists a discourse that foreigners would cause insecurity.
According to Müller, populism is not a recovery thing for liberal democracy and it is a real threat for it (Müller, 2017). Considering the examples above, it is possible to say that populism poses also a threat to the fundamental values of the European Union. Contrary to popular belief that populists will adopt a more moderate stance when they come to power, it is not true in most cases. When we look at the Hungarian example, it can be seen how the judicial organs, election commissions, and the media are taken over by the supporters of the government, and autonomous institutions such as universities are under threat (Eiermann, Mounk, & Gultchin, 2017). For this reason, it is often seen that the principle of the rule of law is thrown aside and this poses a threat to the principle of liberal democracy. Again, as in the case of Hungary, populist governments are prone to cultural protectionism. Anti-immigrant policies and not being included in integration can be observed in this regard. Most of the time, populist governments are distant from international organizations such as the EU. They do not want to delegate their authority to a higher institution and this carries the risk of changing public policies within the European Union. These type of discourses gets closer to the populism with nationalism. The EU does not seem to be able to provide a valid answer to the protectionist rhetoric of populists by providing freedom of travel between member states with a Schengen visa and negotiating processes with Muslim countries such as Turkey (Surel, 2011).
As a result, it can be said that threats of the populism can be divided into two; political and institutional threats. In terms of political risks, populism can produce policies that violate minority rights, and this can lead to the formation of marginalized groups among the population and eventually to revolt. In terms of institutions, populists who assign people from their own ideology to state institutions without merit, according to their own policies, create a threat to democracy by destroying the structure of institutions in the long term, as in the example of the election board (Eiermann, Mounk, & Gultchin, 2017). The assumption that they have the only legitimate power, a vague image of the people, and economic and cultural protectionism have compelled the EU both in terms of domestic and foreign policy.
2. EMMANUEL MACRON’S FRANCE
2.1. Domestic Policy
During the presidential elections in France in May 2017, Macron's biggest opponent was Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right, a true populist. In this struggle, Macron emerged as a neoliberal democracy advocate and an internationalist against Le Pen's radical right-wing, nationalist rhetoric. It can be said that Macron has not had an easy experience in domestic politics since he came to power with 66% of the votes. Firstly, the presence of young and inexperienced deputies in Macron's party, En Marché and their lack of knowledge about the legislation has been criticized since the first days of his rule. On the other hand, the resignation of Chief of Staff Villiers after he could not agree on military budget planning with was an event that shook Macron's image from the very first days. While Villiers was a national defense supporter chief of staff, Macron followed a pro-European stance in defense and made his plans accordingly (Downs, 2017). It can be said that every step of Macron’s domestic policy has a pro-European stance and he also faced strong nationalist demands from both opposition and the public officers. His policies were trying to balance both of them -he called this “radical centrism”- but he never compromised on his pro-European stance.
One of Macron's biggest goals while in power was to make France one of the strongest economies in Europe. For this reason, economic reforms have been on France's agenda frequently since 2017. While seeking a solution to the unemployment problem in the early days of his presidency, he also offered to facilitate economic reforms for companies and investors (Thomas, 2019). This situation caused him to appear increasingly as "the president of the rich" in the eyes of the public. It facilitated the recruitment processes as well as facilitated the dismissal. Macron faced accusations from the public about he is ignoring workers and retirees. In the second half of 2018, the increase in the gasoline tax, one of the economic reforms Macron made to take a leading position in the fight against climate change in the international arena, caused a public uprising, called Yellow Vests, but it was later understood that the situation was not just caused by the tax problem (Naidoo, 2018). These people were rebelling against the income inequality in the society and the general economic policies of the government that looked after the interests of the rich. It can be said that the Yellow Vests movement was one of the most challenging crises for Macron. In terms of the spread of the events to some other European countries, it lasted too long and hindered Macron's foreign policy plans also tarnished his image. In summary, it can be said that under Macron's rule, France faced extreme reactions that undermined Macron's international goals, and various crises were experienced. A part of the public thinks that they are not represented and this mass is marginalized.
2.2. Foreign Policy
The main aim of Macron's foreign policy is to restructure European integration with French reforms and to play a more active role in politics by strengthening his voice within the EU. For these purposes, Macron presented many reform proposals in domestic and foreign policy. His election to the presidency has been interpreted as “France's return to Europe”. In this sense, Macron's main goal in the EU was to make economic reforms that would make the criticisms of the French economy unjustified, both inside and within the EU (Darnis, 2017). It is worth mentioning here that, these reforms Macron said aim to make the European Union a tool to expand French national interests. In addition, it is useful to underline that the money circulating while doing these is German money (Stratfor Analysis, 2018). Another vision of Macron is to provide military cooperation with a common defense policy as the EU and to fight together against the outcomes of globalism such as terrorism and migration. By wanting to erase the invisibility of France in the Hollande period within the EU, Macron emphasized the basic EU values and created an image as if he had come to solve the issues that have not been resolved for a long time, but it is possible to say that he did all of this with pragmatism and national interests (Chopin, 2018).
On the global level, outside the continent of Europe, France continued its claim to be the driving force. President Macron tried to strengthen the security of his commercial presence in the Middle East and Africa, took care of his interests there and tried to be one of the playmakers, and tried to prevent the dangers that could be reflected from there to France itself, such as immigration or terrorist incidents in 2015 (Stratfor Analysis, 2018). Macron also took on the role of a defender of neoliberal democratic values, a supporter of peace, and a mediator in the international arena. His mediation between two opposing groups in Libya is an example of this. Likewise, although he was unsuccessful, he tried to persuade the U.S. not to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. Although it is still dependent on Germany and the U.S. in international matters and does not always get full efficiency in mediation, the foreign policy that Macron wants to create can be easily understood when the role he plays in international affairs as if he were the only defender of European values. This image of Macron as a mediator liberal democrat has become almost a hero when it comes to the issue of the climate crisis. Upon Trump's exit from the Paris Climate Agreement, Macron translated Trump's own populist rhetoric "Make America great again" as "Make our planet great again". He assumed the leadership role to mobilize countries in the climate crisis (Henley, 2017).
2.3. Emmanuel Macron and Populism
Macron came to power in 2017, amid growing doubts over whether populism is a threat to liberal democracy (like the Trump influence in the U.S.). He portrayed himself as a defender of liberal democracy and the EU as a shield against populism (Barthold & Fougeré, 2020). Before talking about Macron's populism, it is worth mentioning that the actors he competed for during the presidential elections were populist and he used it as an anti-populist populism in his election discourse. He changed the right-left cleavage of France's traditional political order, changing this distinction to traditionalists and progressives, and expressed that he saw traditionalists (radical right and left parties) as barriers to globalization and European integration. The first source of Macron's populist discourse is the distinction between “us” and “them” that he stated here. While “them” refer to the followers of the conservative, old-fashioned ideology, “us” represents a new political perspective and centrism. Macron's centrist approach stems from the demand of groups bored with traditional French politics and unrepresented groups. Throughout his campaign, he formed his speeches to meet the demands of these groups, and with the aforementioned "us" concept, he again has the image of a populist leader, arguing that he represents the real people.
In addition to that, like his rivals, like Le Pen, he represented traditional parties as to the unchangeable elites of France. (Barthold & Fougeré, 2020). On the other hand, Perrotino and Guasti argue that his anti-elitism is less than the populists, but it is more than the classical centrist parties (Perottino & Guasti, 2020). At this point, it is possible to say that Macron is close to the concept of technocratic populism when he is evaluated in terms of populism, by introducing himself as the challenger of the current system, the only person who can overcome the traditional right-left cleavage and adopting an anti-establishment discourse. In the technocratic populism that Buštíková and Guasti mentioned, the leader rejects the traditional political order and tests its legitimacy, seeks solutions to problems through non-political experts, and does so by addressing the public directly. (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). Macron, who graduated from ENA that an elitist school of France, and Rothschild's former financier, as an old expert also, used this rhetoric and represented himself and his cabinet as the experts, used technocrat talents as a source of legitimacy (Barthold & Fougeré, 2020). Moreover, the fact that he was a socialist during his ministry of economy and now shifted to the center symbolizes not only the change in Macron's career but also how France has changed with Macron.
3. EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN POLICY
Briefly, the EU, claiming to be the defender of human rights and democracy and the global rule-maker about them, has a foreign policy to promote peace and stability in its environment and its collaborators, as well as within Europe. EU foreign policy largely coincides with the concept of soft power put forward by Joseph Nye (Kugie, 2017). The three main strategies of this concept are to have a culture and political value that is attractive to others and to make foreign policy appear legitimate for these reasons (Nye, 2004). In these ways, desired results in foreign policy are achieved without the need for coercive power. The EU has all three charms required by soft power; has a successful image of regional unity, promotes a culture of liberal democracy, and has a moral humanism to justify its foreign policy actions. Kugie argues that these three soft power tools of EU foreign policy were cracked by the crisis since 2016. One of them was the migration crisis that led to disagreement between member states, even the financial and military aids were made to support Greece and Italy. Because of these disagreements, by forgetting the principle of solidarity of the EU, countries had to fight against immigration nationally alone. The migration crisis shows that a transition from the open society to defense policy. There may be different reasons for EU member states to implement these immigration policies. One of them is undoubtedly the increasing far-right populist pressure in domestic politics. Security issues such as the radical Islamic terrorist attacks and immigration that Europe faced in 2015 strengthened the discourse of right-wing populism and enabled them to criticize the issue from the security level as well as cultural protectionism. Another way that populism affects the foreign policy of the European Union is that it is in opposition to the soft power foreign policy tools of the EU. In this way, it both weakens the EU institutions and tries to reduce the attractiveness of the countries within the EU for refugees (Kugie, 2017). However, this results in the EU moving away from its core values. Such a serious problem brings with it criticism about the hypocrisy of the EU's core values, by delegating responsibility to partners in the Mediterranean like Turkey (which can also be interpreted as avoiding a concrete solution and risks). It damages the prestige of EU foreign policy, the EU contradicts its own core values. Despite all this, due to the unstoppable anti-immigration and radical right, preparations for a similar agreement are made with Libya and Tunisia.
Brexit, which was also a result of a populist campaign, is one of the obstacles to the EU's ability to impose sanctions with soft power in foreign policy. The loss of one of its most important core members has damaged its global rule-maker. In other words, it has caused it to lose its attractiveness. In terms of enlargement, Brexit has also been harmful. The reasons such as free movement of workers, which is one of the reasons for the exit of the UK, increased the suspicions both in the EU countries where Euroscepticism is high and in the candidate countries. Brexit also has contributed to the risk of a domino effect and the already existing discourses of the more national system (Kugie, 2017).
To summarize, European Union’s foreign policy, which was established to promote its own values and ensure its own internal and external security, has caused its own fundamental values to be questioned with the last crises it has experienced. Increasing Euroscepticism has questioned whether integration has been successful, while in parallel, populism has cast doubt on member states' own democracy and commitment to core values. It can be said that the EU, far from spreading its own values, has been questioned with them and has begun to lose its attractiveness in foreign policy, unless measures are taken.
3.1. Current Positions in the European Union’s Foreign Policy
Before mentioning the impact of Macron's populism, it can be said that there are more visibly populist governments that prevent the EU from taking concrete and concerted steps in foreign policy. Members with populist governments such as Hungary and Poland pursue a passive and protective foreign policy aimed at maintaining stability and their own national interests, rather than pursuing an active foreign policy, but this does not mean that their attitude does not corrupt the EU foreign policy, on the contrary, in many crises they delay or prevent a univocal response (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020). It can be said that the highest point of these difficulties was the migration crisis. In particular, the Hungarian government's harsh stance on this issue and the pursuit of bilateral agreements with other countries (like Italy) delayed the EU's action on this issue and made its legitimacy in foreign policy questioned. Likewise, the EU was criticized for being ineffective in its neighborhood policy, especially in the Ukraine crisis, when populist governments felt threatened by destabilization and avoided acting together. While these populist governments try to undermine the coordination between China and the EU, the founder members like Germany and France make the necessary limitations and take precautions to prevent this from happening (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020).
It would be wrong to say that the founder countries, which play leadership and mediator roles in these problems, are always in coordination in the EU foreign policy. In Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean issues, Merkel continues to act as a mediator, both as a country affected by migration in the region (and facing the growing danger of right-wing populism because of migration), and because of her leadership position within the EU, to assist other countries in their fight against migration, while Macron seems to insist on taking the lead on this issue (İnat, 2020). He reiterates its demands for sanctions against Turkey, which both have soldiers in Libya and is experiencing tensions with Greece, at every opportunity. The national interests of this leadership can be summarized as follows: by providing stability in the region, preventing a possible terrorist activity against France, controlling immigration, protect the natural resources, preventing illegal arms and drug trade, and most importantly, being the representative of the European presence in the region through military operations to provide security. His claim to be the representative of European cooperation can be seen as a result of Macron's race with Germany and the UK, especially because of natural resources in Eastern Mediterranean and economic interests in Libya (Örmeci, 2021). With this attitude, France may be trying to limit the dominance of Turkey, which has the largest maritime border in the region, by acting together with countries such as Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, it can be said that the tense relations with Turkey will not be beneficial for both sides to transfer the energy resources of the region to Europe. Thus, Germany on behalf of the EU, with its moderate attitude, maybe looking after this possible cooperation and other existing cooperations with Turkey (Örmeci, 2021).
3.2. The Impact of Macron's Populism on the Foreign Policy of the European Union
Before Macron's populist influence on foreign policy, it is worth mentioning that in general, populists avoid taking an active role in foreign policy and have more protectionist and nationalist approaches (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020). However, Macron's stance can be interpreted as part of the leadership race within the European Union. Macron's leadership race first began in domestic politics, offering economic reforms in his country to join the EU leadership seat, at least as Germany's partner, because as mentioned above, France is still dependent on Germany in EU politics due to economy. At the same time, under the influence of the right-wing populist rise in his country, he proposed economic reforms in the EU and aimed to make France one of the driving forces of the EU again, which he believed that his own citizens needed to feel (Giurlando, 2021). While Merkel was looking for solutions that would cover all EU countries, Macron's joint budget proposal only for the Eurozone region faced the obstacles of Germany and its allies at that time. However, with the aftermath of Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic, this Recovery Fund has been possible for all EU countries, but not in the way Macron imagined. While planning this, Macron aimed to provide leadership on issues such as the climate crisis and nuclear armament, in which he claimed the role of mediator and even hero around the world, by strengthening the common currency zone, and being the sole sovereign defender of EU values against powers such as the USA and China. (Giurlando, 2021).
The claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the values of a more interventionist union can be interpreted as a clear indication of populism. In other words, as a leader who came to the power with the Europeanist and anti-populist discourses, Emmanuel Macron also shows populist rhetoric with the claim that he is the only legitimate representative of European values. According to Bordignon, the soft populism that Macron created with his European identity by taking advantage of the political situation of France at that time can be seen as a clue for Macron's approach to the EU. Against the domestic populists which target the lack of EU’s democratic institutions, Macron shows an anti-populist populism and aims to re-democratize the EU with the French leadership (Bordignon, 2017).
Emerging as a defender of liberal democracy at a time when nationalisms and right-wing populism were awakening, Emmanuel Macron promised to be the protector of European civilization and its values, often making references to them in his policies within the EU. It can be said that because of his opponents in domestic politics, Macron saw how the populists directly addressed the people and the positive feedback of this and started to use this method within the EU as well. An example of this is the European Conference call he made in 2019, he preferred to communicate directly with the public to renew Europe. However, who should speak on behalf of the people and who has this right legitimately has the potential to cause democratic crises within the EU (Grunstein, 2019).
Emmanuel Macron used populism’s own methods to present a better offer to domestic populism in France, and reach his dreamed leadership position in the European Union, invisible hierarchical equality with Germany. Macron, who was able to partially reach his goals with the reforms made in the EU and France, aware that he cannot surpass Germany economically, wants to take a leading position in foreign policy and be a playmaker against Germany's moderating attitude. Considered in this context, the economic reforms Macron is trying to do both inside and outside the EU, his efforts to renew the EU as the legitimate representative of Europe, the dominance he is trying to establish in the Eastern Mediterranean issues, contrary to Germany's mediating and pacifying attitude, the economic interests he expects from here (it should not be forgotten that every economic interest brings him one step closer to sharing the leadership with Germany in the EU), the tension with Turkey and the demands for sanctions, the heroism he claimed in the climate crisis, all of these can be seen as a result of Macron's leadership race with Germany. From a macro perspective, the final point that this race within the EU and the populism it uses while competing will take it can be interpreted as a want to be the sole representative of Europe and balance the other rising powers of the world.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study shows that Macron's policies, which emerged as anti-populist populism, cause conflicts in foreign policy as they evolve into a leadership race with Germany within the EU. Like other populist governments, it has an impact on EU foreign policy. When examined step by step, it can be seen that in every economic reform and foreign policy move he has promised or realized since his candidacy, leadership within Europe is aimed. This study also shows that Macron's populist discourse and his claim to be the only legitimate defender of European values, are the rhetoric that tries to legitimize these leadership moves. So, this study has contributed to the literature in terms of showing the populist sources and foreign policy results of this leadership pursuit.
Understanding this logic of Macron is important in terms of understanding that the French President, who was promising as a liberal democratic president struggled against populism in Europe, showed populist attitudes even in this struggle, that is, methods are intertwined in the opposition of liberal democracy and populism. This situation can also be interpreted as populism is not illiberalism, and this is another subject of study. Another research that can be done after this study may be how other populists such as Hungary and Poland affect the EU foreign policy, which is very briefly mentioned in this study and the differences between them and Macron's populism. Therefore, this study and subsequent studies are important to understand how populism affects not only the EU's democracy but also other policy areas.
EZGİ YAREN AKYOL
2021
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