Zeynep Arın

How did the EU manage to have a common foreign policy towards the Russia- Ukraine crisis?

 

EU’s Victory of a Common Foreign Policy

 

Zeynep Arın

 

YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PSIR 332 EUROPEAN UNION

 

 

“One reason for creating the European Community was to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs. “

~ Walter Hallstein

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

The European Union is regarded as success story in terms of regional cooperation. Since the EU was founded it became more and more supranational and managed to become a single actor in many ways. Foreign Policy is the one aspects that sabotages this success story. Policy areas like security are too important and states prioritize their security needs over the EU integration project. The issue of security has always been a discussion point for the EU. When Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February in 2022 in an unjustified way the EU faced the biggest crisis it has ever faced. Although the EU is famous for its common foreign policy failures throughout history it manages to create a common policy in a very short time. The EU did so because at the end of the day this crisis was no surprise. This essays aims to analyze this topic in detail and answer the question of how the EU managed to form a common foreign policy. In doing so this essay will firstly give a brief overview of EU foreign policy in general and later discuss he power the EU holds as an international actor. Then the previous common policy failures will be discussed and mainly the reasons behind them. Next, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will be explained and then the actions the EU took against the invasion so the actual policy will be discussed. Lastly there will be a short evaluation of the current situation and the question of how successful the EU really was will be evaluated.

EU’s Foreign Policy - A Brief Overview

 

The main aim of the integration of the European Union is to cooperate in every aspect within the Union and foreign policy is one part of it. Although even today the EU does not have a total common foreign policy the birth of the Union started with the goal of peace in foreign policy between the member states. As Stefan Lehne clarifies, the EU started working on a common foreign policy in the 1970s. According to this plan the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” was established in the 1990s. Bu the author argues that this project is still not finished and very fragile even today (Lehne, 2017). The process of foreign policy integration is not as easy as cooperation in other areas such as trade, economy, culture etc. This is because foreign policy means security and security is the most important criteria for a state. Member states of the EU will all prioritize their own security needs over cooperation. This priority an be observed in every way the EU takes decisions. Although over time the EU transformed from a intergovernmentalist structure more and more to a supranational structure, foreign policy and security issues have still more intergovernmentalist characteristics. When there was the pillar structure in decision making procedure in the EU more and more decision making subject were transferred to the first pillar which is supranational. This means that the EU takes the decisions as it were a single state within its own legislative bodies. Security was one of the very few topics that was left in the intergovernmentalist pillar. Today the pillar system does not exist anymore but still security issues are voted with unanimity within the member states. This means that even if one state does not agree with the decisions to be taken by the Council the decision gets vetoed. According to the realist perspective security is a topic of high politics which means it is upmost important and that states should have the final say. If the goals of the EU are considered which are to be an influential actor in world affairs, to be the representative of democracy, human rights and peace it is upmost important for the Union to have a common foreign policy and to act as one unit.

EU as a Foreign Policy Actor - Normative Power

The EU is today a very important foreign policy actor in international relations. The power the EU holds within itself does not come only from military power, but also from normative power aspects. Ian Manners argues that leaving civilian and military power aspects aside the EU has an international identity and ideational impacts that show normative power (Manners, 2002). So this means that the EU has the power to influence other actors in line with its values. This would actually make the EU really strong in the international arena. But this kind of normative power is really fragile and takes a long time to be fully established. If there is one crisis, one war, one invasion all that normative power looses its meaning and more tangible power instruments like weapons and sanctions become important. If analyzed together with the Russia-Ukraine crisis it is clear that the normative power of the EU is not a direct tool for the solution. The normative power of the EU can only contribute in the way that it influences other countries to take a stance against Russia and to help Ukraine.

EU as a Foreign Policy Actor - Failure after Failure

The EU is trying to create a common foreign policy and by now it is an important factor in International affairs. However, history shows that the trials of a common foreign policy are a serious of failures. “The EU has external political impact on a broad range of foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, CFSP diplomacy failed in its approach to many of the key issue on the international agenda (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, Rwanda, Congo, Iraq, and so on)” (Keukeleire, 2003). Why was the EU so unsuccessful in foreign policy when it tries so hard to cooperate? A common foreign policy demands tools, equipment, institutions. Members states have the tendency to not want to provide these materials for a common foreign policy. Some states believe that it is unnecessary to intervene in every crisis. Others believe that some problems will solve themselves and that it will only be a lost of money to intervene. The most important problem is however the conflict of interest. The European Union is a big union with 27 member states who all have different interests and as the Union enlarged the interest became more and more diversified. Especially if the ex- communist states are considered who have a different understanding of culture and state it gets harder and harder for the EU to have similar interests in foreign policy. And since states to not want to comply when it comes to their foreign policy interests, they prefer to cooperate less. All states have separate bilateral agreements with states outside of the EU, especially when it comes to trade agreements. Germany which is one of the most powerful member states of the European Union is heavily dependent on energy resources deployed from Russia. After the invasion of Ukraine started many Eu countries cut their energy ties completely with Russia. This was not the case for Germany. Germany cut some energy ties but it will need some time before being able to cut oil, coil and gas ties with Russia completely. Germany is being criticized for this behavior but as the Chancellor Olaf Scholz made clear it is about hurting Russia without hurting oneself. This understanding shows that every state has its own benefit as a priority and will not fold when it comes this. Although this example did not lead to a failure in forming a common foreign policy it may be slowing the process. So the main reason for why the EU failed to have a common foreign policy is the diversification of interests of the member states.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

The totally unjustified invasion of Ukraine by Russia was the biggest crisis the EU has to face since it was formed. On 24 February 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine and many civilians lost their lives and livelihoods. The crisis is still going on still people are dying. The EU sent weapons to Ukraine, which is as Von der Leyen states the first time the EU finances purchasing the delivery of weaponry to a state that is under invasion (Von der Leyen, 2022). The EU imposed severe sanctions and concluded several meetings to solve this humanitarian crisis. So why did the EU manage to built a common foreign policy in this specific crisis? This crisis did not come as a surprise to the EU and they had plenty of time to prepare. Ukraine is already a divided country. One part of the society is very Europhile, while the other part is really Eurosceptic. So in a society divided like that the government changes from elections to elections and the orientation of Ukraine changes too. Despite these changes over time, especially after the Orange Revolution Ukraine became more and more Europeanized, but still as Goeffrey Pridham argues The EU's policy toward Ukraine has been characterized by a deliberate semi-distance, as defined by its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and later Eastern Partnership Program, both of which have firmly excluded any guarantee of eventual EU membership. Various elements on both sides of the EU-Ukraine relationship have bolstered this policy consistency. Ukraine tries to show Europe that it becomes more liberal and democratic but the divided society makes it hard (Pridham, 2014). This attitude becomes more and more critical for Russia since it does not want to loose legitimacy and control in the region. The signs of this invasion started in December 2021 when Russia increased military deployment on the Russian boarders. Also the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 had also happened. So this invasion was o surprise for anybody. As Fama and Musiol argue even before the Russian invasion, certain European countries had begun to place a larger priority on defense. The invasion in Ukraine has triggered significant changes that will almost certainly remain as building blocks for the EU's future defense role. This may even gradually increase the EU's ability to intervene as a military player in complementarity with NATO, a long-held ambition that has largely remained a pipe dream. It might feed into a European tendency of putting a greater emphasis on strong power (Fama & Musiol, 2022). The crisis broke out after the talks about Ukraine becoming a member of NATO and possibly the EU. At this point the relations between Russia and EU must also be considered. EU always tried to use its normative power to change Russia into amore democratic state with EU values but Russia resisted. Hiski Haukkala argues that the 2014 crisis in Ukraine was actually a proxy conflict between Russia and the EU and a way of Russia showing that it has still an importance place in the Eurocentric international arena (Haukkala, 2015). So now it can bee seen that these events were not a shock to the EU and so they managed to lead a common foreign policy. There are still some member states like Hungary who have conflicting interests and who have close ties with Russia but at this moment all states are on the same page regarding the main aim which is o stop Putin. At this point big member states have a great influence on other states. Some states have close ties with Russia and maybe it would be more beneficial for their states not to cut ties with Russia but as long as they are within the European Union they have to comply.

EU’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

The member states of the European Union started acting to the crisis in a matter of days and created sanction packages and held meeting and made statements. All these common diplomacy moves will be summarized and evaluated in this section of the essay. Before the invasion of Ukraine started on the 21st of February 2022 Putin increased military activity at the Ukrainian borders and recognized the independence of Luhansk and Donetsk and troop deployments to these regions started. These regions are actually in the Ukraine. At the same day Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen gave an official statement where they expressed their concerns and underlined that these actions are not to be accepted by the EU. Again at the same day the first sanction package was created by the EU Foreign Ministers. These sanctions included the travel ban of representatives in the Russian Duma who voted for the independent recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk. Special sanctions were given to individuals and institutions who are against the sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia was prevented from getting financial support from Europe. The Chancellor of Germany halted the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline which was used to transport energy from Russia to Germany. Two days later when the invasion started the EU states made a joined statement and condemned Russia for tis unjustified military actions in Ukraine. The member states also emphasized that the actions of Russia is against international law and that it harms European peace. They agreed to develop new sanction packages for Russia. On the 10th and 11th March the member states met in Versailles and agreed to continue military, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and that the Russian aggression cannot be accepted under any circumstances. The member states also agreed on creating a greater pressure on Russia and they supported their decision with several further decisions. The defense capabilities of EU member states were decided to increase and the energy dependency on Russia to be decreased. All these meetings and decision were done together with other international meetings and decisions like the G7. The EU played an important role at the international level in this sense.

The Second Sanction Package was created on the 25th of February. These sanctions included sanctions for individuals like Putin, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and other important political figures. There were also financial sanctions designated for banks, which undermined the Russian economy deeply. The export for certain technological product and free visa was also suspended. The third sanction package released three days later included fly bands. The prohibition on banks was enlarged to people who work with the Russian Central Bank. Seven SWIFT systems from Russia for investment, funding, sale were also banned. There were also sanctions agains the Russian Media and the ban on individuals was expanded. The last Sanction Package was made on the 15th of March after the G7 meeting. Most of the previous sanctions were expanded and others like the prohibition of transaction in relation to state enterprises and the prohibition of new energy based investments were added. These sanctions had the aim to hinder Kremlin to finance further military action and hurt the economic system of Russia.

All EU member states and all EU state officials made statements where they emphasize the importance of this crisis and argue repeatedly that they will do everything as the EU to bring an end to this unjustified military aggression. Charles Michel made a statement after the meeting in Versailles as follow:

“The Versailles meeting comes two weeks after Russia started a war against Ukraine, two weeks during which the European Union has demonstrated its unity, robustness and stability. We have been able to come together to decide on unprecedented sanctions that have an impact, that have an effect. We have been able to come together to strongly support the Ukrainian people, who are battling courageously. Financial support, humanitarian support, support in terms of hosting refugees of course, and in a first that reflects our ambition to act on European defence, we have decided to provide support via the Peace Facility, mobilising equipment, including military equipment, and to add a further €500 million to the Peace Facility in this context” (Michel, 2022).

This statement clearly shows that the European Union created a common foreign policy and Michel underlines that the EU was very fast in doing so. He also clarifies the goals the EU has set for itself in this time of crisis and how it will act. All these sanctions, meetings and statements who that the EU was for the first time able to create a common foreign policy.

Evaluation

It is clear that the EU managed to form a common foreign policy but it is another question if the policies were successful. Surely the EU managed to hurt Russia and also cooperate with other states like the US, Canada and Japan but if the main aim is to stop the aggression is a short period of time it failed. It has been more than three months since the invasions started and it slowed down but it still continues and what will happen in the near future is a question. All in all the EU brought a new dimension to its foreign policy journey but only time will tell if this ability to form a common foreign policy will continue in the future.

Conclusion

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a defining moment for the EU and one of the biggest crisis it had to face. The EU in general has the foreign policy goal to represent and spread EU values like democracy, human rights and freedom. It is a quite strong actor in international affairs but lacks the ability to acts as one. Because security issues which are high politics are the top priority of every state, they hesitate in cooperating in these areas. The main reason why they fail to cooperate are the diverse interests state have, which is also correlated to the enlargements of the European Union. The common foreign policy attempts of the EU always failed throughout history and there are several examples where the EU just failed to do anything. When the invasion of Ukraine started the EU created a common foreign policy in a very short period of time. Although this might seem surprising at start it must be clarified that this crisis was not a surprise for anyone. The tensions between Russia and Ukraine had already a peak point in 2014 when a war broke out because of the annexation of Crimea. So they were already prepared in a sense. The quick meetings and sanctions that followed showed a coherent foreign policy. The EU member states announced four sanction packages in total which all aimed to damage Russia, diplomatically, militarily and economically. Although efforts in the international and European scale were not yet enough to stop the invasion the European Union demonstrated a common foreign policy for the first time.

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